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Introduction  
 
With Bédat v Switzerland,1 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights adds 
to its case law on the limits of free speech protection for journalists. The judgment, which 
reverses a previous Chamber judgment,2 is noteworthy for three reasons. Firstly, it provides 
further insight into the concept of “responsible journalism” that the Court increasingly relies 
on when examining cases relating to press freedoms. Secondly, in balancing free speech with 
the right to privacy, the Grand Chamber clarifies which types of published information 
cannot be deemed to contribute to the public interest. Finally, the Grand Chamber asserts that 
the obligation on contracting parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
to uphold the presumption of innocence of defendants before trial may also require them to 
limit press freedoms whenever the latter pose a risk to the former. 
 
Facts 
 
The applicant was a journalist who published an article that included information on ongoing 
criminal proceedings against a motorist involved in a tragic road accident. The accident had 
caused controversy and heated debate in Switzerland. The journalist came across the 
information in a rather unorthodox manner: a third party claiming damages in the 
proceedings had lost a copy of the case file at a shopping centre, and this copy was then 
mailed to the applicant’s office. 
 
In the impugned article, the journalist shared a summary of questions put to the motorist 
during his interrogation by the police and the investigating judge, along with statements from 
his wife and doctor. While the article did not include any explicit or implicit assessments on 
his guilt or innocence, its tone was hostile to the defendant, with headlines such as “He lost 
his marbles” or “The reckless driver’s version.” After the journalist was fined, he applied to 
the Court alleging that this violated his right to free speech. While the Second Section of the 
Court found that the fine was in breach of the journalist’s free speech rights, the Grand 
Chamber overturned the Second Section’s judgment and found that no violation had 
occurred. 
 
 Responsible Journalism as a Precondition of Free Speech Protection 
 
The Grand Chamber began its proportionality assessment by referring to the concept of 
responsible journalism. Building on recent judgments,3 the Court stated that free speech 
protection is available to journalists “subject to the proviso that they act in good faith in order 
to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the tenets of responsible 
journalism.”4 According to the Court, “the concept of responsible journalism also embraces 
the lawfulness of the conduct of a journalist, and the fact that a journalist has breached the 
law is a relevant, albeit not decisive, consideration when determining whether he or she has 
acted responsibly.”5 Based on this, the Court attached particular weight to the fact that the 
applicant should have been aware of the confidential nature of the information and the fact 
that its publication would breach the Swiss Criminal Code.  
 
Bédat joins a series of judgments from 20166 in which the Court found no infringement of 
journalists’ free speech rights in cases relating to “illegal preparatory acts of newsgathering.”7 
Thus, the overall lawfulness of the journalist’s conduct factors heavily into the Court’s 
reasoning on the protection he or she can expect under freedom of expression. However, the 
Court clarifies that the legality of the journalist’s conduct is not the decisive factor in the 
proportionality exercise. This is to acknowledge that when breaking the law is a prerequisite 
for the journalist to access information, the publication of which is in the public interest, this 
illegality will not undermine the journalist’s claims under freedom of expression. The crucial 
element of the proportionality exercise is, therefore, the public interest in the published 
information. However, as will be explained in the section below, the Bédat case reveals some 
disagreement among the Court’s judges as to the factors that inform the assessment of 
whether information was in the public interest. 
 
Privacy Versus Expression: Defining the Public Interest  
 
In examining the harm the article caused to the reputation of the defendant, the Court 
reiterated that contracting parties to the ECHR have a positive obligation to protect the 
reputation of citizens under the right to respect for one’s private and family life. How should 
this duty be balanced against free speech? The Court has approached this matter from the 
starting point that privacy and freedom of expression enjoy an equal status under the 
Convention.8 Therefore, the Court does not recognize that one automatically has primacy 
over the other. Instead, the focus is placed on determining whether the public interest in 
publication of the information outweighed the duty to protect the individual’s privacy.9 In the 
Second Section judgment, the Court placed emphasis on the fact that the accident was a 
matter of great national concern. Thus, it reached the conclusion that by providing insight 
into what led to the tragedy, the impugned article informed the public interest. This approach 
was contested by the respondent government in its arguments before the Grand Chamber. The 
Grand Chamber paid heed to the government’s concerns and found that the information 
published by the applicant was “highly personal, and even medical, in nature, including 
statements by the accused person’s doctor as well as letters sent by the accused from his place 
of detention.”10  This information according to the Grand Chamber, could at the very most 
satisfy “an unhealthy curiosity,” rather than contribute to the public interest.11 This led the 
Court to adopt the view that the type of information disclosed about the defendant called for 
“the highest level of protection” under the right to privacy.12 
 
The case highlights the existence of some disagreement between the Second Section and 
Grand Chamber as to the appropriate assessment of the public interest. In the Second Section 
judgment, the Court cautioned that a restriction on press freedom must not be passed down 
before ensuring “that the penalty does not amount to a form of censorship tending to 
discourage the press from making criticisms.”13 The Court went on to stress that sanctions to 
journalists are “liable to hamper the media in performing their task as a purveyor of 
information and public watchdog.”14 The Grand Chamber, while acknowledging that the 
article related to a matter of public interest, ultimately concluded that this interest was 
undermined by the tone of the article and the nature of the disclosed information. This 
approach may be difficult to square with the Court’s previous case law. The Court has held 
that it suffices for a piece of journalism to be perceived as being capable of contributing to 
the public interest, regardless of whether it does so successfully.15  In Bédat, the Grand 
Chamber avoided establishing clear criteria as to how the public interest should be assessed 
in such sensitive cases, and instead referred to the domestic judgment of the Swiss Federal 
Court on the matter which, per the Grand Chamber, “contained no hint of arbitrariness” in its 
assessment of the public interest.16 
 
Fair Trial Versus Expression 
 
In Bédat, the Court also relied on the state’s positive obligation to protect the defendant’s 
presumption of innocence to argue that the restriction imposed on the journalist was 
proportionate. The Grand Chamber focused on the risk the impugned article posed to the 
fairness of trial rather than on its actual impact. The Second Section judgment had taken the 
opposite approach. For the Second Section, the negative impact of the article to the 
presumption of innocence was mitigated by the fact that the trial took place two years after 
the article was published and professional judges, rather than a jury, were involved. This 
analysis of the impugned article’s impact ‘after the fact’ was rejected by the Grand Chamber. 
Regardless of the eventual outcome of the trial, the emphasis according to the Grand 
Chamber should be placed on the risk the article posed to a fair trial by examining the 
conditions at the time of its publication.  
 
The balancing exercise between free speech and fair trial is a significant addition to the 
Court’s handling of such cases. It seems that the duty of the state to uphold the presumption 
of innocence goes beyond merely ensuring that adequate safeguards to this effect exist in the 
judicial system. After Bédat, this duty also requires the state to make use of all the means at 
its disposal to minimize broader threats to this presumption, even if this entails limiting press 
freedoms on occasion. As the impugned article did not make reference to the defendant’s 
guilt or innocence, it can be deduced that an article that discloses confidential information 
that paints a highly negative picture of the defendant will suffice to trigger the state’s duty to 
intervene and protect the fairness of an impending trial. A risk to the presumption of 
innocence suffices, as no actual impact needs to be demonstrated. However, further 
judgments are required to clarify the exact scope of the obligation and the types of negative 
coverage that would be permitted. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Bédat makes for an interesting addition to the Court’s free speech case law. It clarifies that 
journalists are not above the law17 when discharging their duties as “public watchdogs.” It 
illustrates that negative coverage of a defendant before a trial engages both the defendant’s 
privacy and fair trial rights. Striking the appropriate balance will rely on whether the 
journalist can make a credible case that the information published informed the public 
interest successfully.  
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